Ramblings of a Godless Heathen

Atheism and religious extremism are both on the rise - it's time we talked about it

  To be an atheist in the United Kingdom today is a thankfully easy thing. The 2011 census states that a more than a quarter of the population officially have no religion, and a poll this April revealed that only a third of Britons believe religion has a positive role to play in the country, while over a quarter believe it has an actively negative effect. However, religious extremism is also on the increase - the exodus of British Muslims to fight for IS in Iraq and Syria and the rising social media popularity of Protestant extremist groups like Britain First prove that.

  In a Britain where both extremes of attitude to faith - total disbelief and total belief - are becoming more common, it is important to talk about this, even if it does provoke discomfort to do so. The champions of what is often (mis)termed 'militant atheism'  - people like Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and the late Christopher Hitchens - have reached the point now where they are alienating as many people as they convert. It is perhaps time then for a less charged discussion. Here goes...


What's in a Name?

  To start with, let's define some terms. We'll kick off with the aforementioned 'militant atheist' - a nonsense term if there ever was one. A militant is someone who takes up arms in the name of a cause; very few people have ever taken up arms in the name of not believing in a god - why would you? (And no, Stalin doesn't count. Don't go there.)


  Atheist means simply someone who does not believe in any gods. To be clear, it does not mean they believe there definitely aren't any - just that, on balance, they think there is insufficient reason to believe there are. What people mean when they say 'militant atheist' is usually antitheist - i.e. someone who is opposed to religious belief. It is entirely possible to be an atheist without being an antitheist. 

  Theist, as you probably guessed, is someone who believes in at least one god - they may believe in many more. The word for this is polytheist, whereas someone who believes in a single deity is a monotheist. Some faiths have a concept of multiple aspects of a single deity having semi-independent existence of their own - e.g. Hinduism and most denominations of Christianity - which is known as pluriform monotheism. 

  Agnostic is a more ambiguous term - technically it describes anyone not 100% certain that god(s) either exist or that they don't, which includes most atheists and most theists. More usually, however, it is used to describe someone who is halfway between the two - i.e. someone who considers the probability of the existence of god(s) to be as likely as it is not. These people are pretty rare, in my experience.


Who's Who?

  The three most important faiths within the UK, according to the 2011 census, are Christianity (59.5%), Islam (4.4%) and Hinduism (1.9%), with 25.7% of the population having no religion. Within Christianity, the most important denominations are Anglicanism (62%), Roman Catholicism (13.5%), Presbyterianism (6%) and Methodism (3.4%). 

[statistics from a 2005 estimate]

  The British Social Attitudes Survey suggests a somewhat different picture, however. The 2013 edition put Christianity on 41.6%, Islam on 4.6% and Hinduism on 1.5%, with a majority (50.6%) stating they had no religion. There are numerous possible causes for this discrepancy - more up-to-date data, a smaller sample size, the elimination of the problem of parents putting their own faith as their children's on census forms etc. (it should be noted, however, that the margin of error in the Survey was only 1.72%).


What I reckon...

  I am, and have been more or less since the age of fifteen, an atheist. This does not mean, as noted above, I am certain no gods exist - what it means is that I have never seen any particularly compelling evidence to prove that any do. The claim that one or more supernatural entities exist, hidden from our sight, and control many aspects of the world and human life seems to me to be quite an incredible one. It requires, therefore, some fairly incredible evidence - evidence which is not apparent to me.

  Though I was raised a Christian (of somewhat hazy denomination - mostly Anglican with a bit of Methodist thrown in for good measure) I was never a particularly devout one, and - following a brief period of heightened religious awareness in my early teens - more or less slowly lost my faith over the course of a couple of years. It simply seemed to me that the only reason I believed in God was that I had been told he existed, without any independent corroboration of the fact. Whilst I am open to any evidence any theist might care to proffer, so far I have seen nothing even remotely convincing.

  Following the loss of my faith I became fairly antitheistic for a brief period. I would now consider myself somewhat less so, but I do believe the existence of religion causes a few problems. My opposition is not really to the kind of personal spiritual belief which characterises many ancient polytheistic religions and the so-called New Age beliefs of the twentieth century. Whilst some of these ideas do strain my credulity - frequently well past breaking point - they do little real harm. No, my main concern is organised religion.


The Dangers of Organised Religion

  I would define organised religion as one which has a hierarchy within it - where certain people are placed above others in the religious pecking order. They also tend to have what you could consider the 'traditional' trappings of religion - holy books, places of worship, formal prayers and rituals. The Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England are the two clearest examples of this kind of set-up, but it also includes most other Christian denominations, as well as most Judaic, Islamic, Sikh, Buddhist  denominations, and many others besides.

  The issue with these kinds of hierarchical religions is they impress upon their members the idea of obedience - blind obedience, without question. The problem is especially marked when children are introduced to such organisations - the human impulse to listen to and take heed of the advice of our elders, essential for survival in early humans, allows indoctrination and exploitation of young people. Vulnerable adults, such as those with severe learning difficulties or mental illnesses, are also easy targets for these hierarchies. The upper echelons of such religious groups - Archbishops, Cardinals, Ayatollahs and the like - are able to exert massive influence over vast swathes of people.

  This is a form of social control. Throughout history, the unelected leaders of religious organisations have wielded enormous power over the populations they ostensibly serve. They have also frequently collaborated with governments to the detriment of the people - the complicity of the Catholic Church in the atrocities of the fascist regimes in Italy and Spain  in the twentieth century (though less so in Germany) being perhaps the most dramatic example of this. Ultimately, the fact that anyone wields such power without being democratically elected is concerning.


Blind Faith

  This leads me to another (linked) problem with the more dogmatic religions - the accepting of doctrine on blind faith alone. This occurs in most religions, to varying degrees, but it is particularly pronounced in Wahhabi Islam, Orthodox Judaism and Christian denominations such as Mormonism (and in other Christian Churches before the secularisation of the late 20th Century). There is a fine line between these extremely dogmatic faiths and dangerous cults and extremist groups. It is no coincidence that IS, for example, are followers of a particularly extreme form of Wahhabi. 

  The practice of accepting doctrine on the basis of faith - i.e. without independent evidence - is inherently worrisome. It begets a mindset which is easily corruptible - even if the faith itself is benign. Stalin, for example (see, he does come in somewhere) received training as an Orthodox priest; since the population of the Soviet Union was predominantly Orthodox Christian before the Revolution, he and the other Soviet leaders were able to exploit this to inculcate a culture of blind obedience to the Stalinist version of Communism. Indeed, he revived the Church in 1942 in order to assist in the war effort. 

  Unquestioning obedience to authority and acceptance of doctrine without supporting fact is how demagogues build up support for their ideologies without challenge, and it is a mindset which is fostered by the dogmatism of many religious groups. Sceptiscism is the sign of a healthy, enquiring mind -  nothing should be taken on faith alone.


Conclusions

  I hope I have outlined clearly my own beliefs and just two of the principal issues I see with organised religion in the 21st century. This is not to say there are not others, and it is certainly not to say that religion does not have its positives. Talking about faith, why one is or is not religious, and what the issues are which one sees in people of differing beliefs to oneself is still something of a taboo in British society today - but it shouldn't be. Only by having a frank, honest and open dialogue can we resolve these issues and challenge the extremist positions taken by some individuals. Faith - or lack thereof - is a protected characteristic under UK anti-discrimination laws, but that shouldn't mean we can't talk about it and criticise it if need be.

  if we don't, after all, we've seen what the consequences can be.

Here We Go Again

  MPs in the House of Commons yesterday voted by 524 to 43 in favour of UK airstrikes against IS targets in Iraq. Ladies and gentlemen, here we go again. Barack Obama last week became the fourth successive US President to declare on live television an American bombing campaign in the Iraq region; now, David Cameron joins him in declaring military action in the failing state just three years after the last British forces withdrew from the country.

  War in Iraq seems to have become something of a hobby for the Anglo-American military-industrial complex. This time, though, we are not fighting the iron-fisted tyrant that was Saddam Hussein - instead, the enemy is a group of ultra-radical fundamentalist Islamists; a group whose interpretation of the Qur'an combins the worst evils of the early campaigns of bloodshed emanating from seventh-century Medina and more modern Wa'habist ideologies of an ultra-strict religious conservatism and adherence to a twisted brand of Sharia law. A target, therefore, one might think worthy of Britain's aggression? Perhaps.

  The problem is, though, so much of the current problem is derived directly from the Iraq War of 2003 and the earlier Gulf War of 1990. Despite the protestations of senior government figures to the contrary, blowback from overseas theatres of war is a real and present problem, and the history of modern British and American involvement in the Middle East is scarred with it. From the Afghan campaigns of the 1980s, which kickstarted the rise of the Taliban, to the brutal murder of Drummer Lee Rigby last May - whose perpetrators explicitly stated their aim as revenge for slaughtered Muslims in Iraq - the US-UK alliance is dogged by bloody reprisals against their people for the governments' actions abroad.

The territory controlled by the IS as of 22/09/14

  The success of the Islamic State, formerly an al-Qaeda offshoot, is based to a not inconsiderable degree on the violent actions of Western powers in the Middle East over the last half-century or so. The Arab Spring may have destabilised the region enough for ISIS to emerge in Syria, but it has been the justified hatred of Western interventionism which has helped to fuel its transformation from one of many small rebel groups set against the Assad regime to a de facto independent country straddling the borders of two of the regions former powers, and it is the weakness and sectarianism of Iraq in the wake of the Alliance's disastrous earlier invasion which has allowed the armies of Islamist extremism to run roughshod across the lands once home to the greatest civilisations on Earth.

  So, here we go, back into Iraq. So far the UK - along with the other European powers participating in the action (Denmark and Belgium) - are loathe to expand operations into Syria, but now that the USA has taken that step, in defiance of Assad's protestations of illegality, it can only be a matter of time. This war will be one without borders, one which Cameron has said could take three years but which could easily last five times that. Another war in an unstable area, and what will we be left with at the end of it? Two shattered states, a Middle East infected with a stronger poison of religious extremism than ever before and greater and greater hatred for the 'Great Satan' of Western intervention.

  And that's assuming we even win.

ISIS and the War for the Middle East

  The situation in Iraq is dire, and growing more so almost by the hour. The incursion of Salafi Jihadists fighting under the banner of ISIS into the north-west of the country represents an existential threat to the country's fragile democracy. Around 7,000 fighters have put an army of over a quarter of a million to rout and seized control of around a third of Iraqi territory. This is a staggering feat for an organisation which did not exist fifteen years ago.



  Things are worse, though, than they appear at first glance, because this war is neither explainable in terms of bipolar conflict nor limited to Iraq. The map to the right shows the current state of Iraq and Syria, with the territories controlled by the major players detailed. The green areas in the north are under the control of the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, the pink area to the west is held by Assad's regime in Damascus and the purple area is under Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's control. The light blue areas are held by the Free Syrian Army and other, largely moderate Syrian rebel groups. The grey area is ISIS. 

  It is immediately obvious that a warzone of this size and complexity is about far more than just ISIS vs. Baghdad. This war is one which has origins dating back decades, even centuries, and which has the capacity to spill over yet more borders and engulf more of the Middle East. To understand the nature of this war, it is first necessary to look at the fundamental roots of the conflict in the region. Oldest and perhaps most pressing of these is the schism between Sunni and Shia Islam.


Death of a Prophet

  It was the death of the Prophet Muhammed in the year 632 AD (10 AH according to the  Islamic Hijri calendar) which catalysed the great schism. With the Prophet who had united the Arabs and began the conquest of the Middle East dead, a new leader for the fledgling Rashidun Caliphate had to be chosen. The eventual choice, Muhammed's father-in-law Abu Bakr, was made by general consensus, as was the Arabian custom of the time, a method which is supported by the Sunni community. The Shia, however, believe that only Allah may choose a leader, and that - through Muhammed - he had selected Ali (Muhammed's son-in-law) as the Prophet's successor.

  Although Ali did eventually become Caliph, after the assassination of 3rd Caliph Uthman ibn Affan in 656 AD, the split between these two Islamic factions remained. The massacre after the Battle of Karbala in 61 AH (680 AD) intensified and solidified the divide. Though this is, to all intents and purposes. ancient history, the importance of these events for Sunni and Shia alike remains very real. Over time, different cultural and religious practices have further differentiated the two groups and the rivalry between them has grown.

  It is the political divide which most concerns the current situation. The Islamic world has seen significant violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims over the centuries, and this has intensified in recent years. From Pakistan to Yemen, inter-sect conflict has become the norm for the divided Muslim community. In the majority of Muslim countries, Sunnis are the larger group, and Shias are often persecuted.  Iraq itself has been one of the worst-hit places; in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War the incidence of Sunni-Shia killings has frown dramatically. By 2008, over 1100 Sunni suicide bombers had attacked Shia-populated areas, whilst government-sponsored Shia death squads routinely tortured and killed Sunnis in the early years of the new Iraqi state. 

  Nouri al-Maliki has proven himself a sectarian leader of the worst kind. His government has discriminated against and disenfranchised Iraq's majority Sunni Arab population and the Kurds in the north in favour of the Shia Arab community to which he himself belongs. His first reaction to the incursion of ISIS forces into his country was not to remedy the relative lack of Sunni officials in his government in the interests of national unity, but to remove those few who did exist and arrest his own (Sunni) Deputy Prime Minister. This is a man chosen by the electorate of Iraq to lead their country through this crisis, but to whom a large portion of the blame can be ascribed and whose current policies are only making a bad situation worse. 

  His warning to the USA that, should they not initiate bombings against ISIS, he will ask the Iranians to instead belies this sectarian agenda. The Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s may have been initiated by Saddam Hussein's megalomania, but the conflict - the twentieth century's longest - has left scars in the minds of many in Iraq, and the country is widely disliked by the Sunni population due to its Shia theocracy. With the dubiously reformist Rouhani as Maliki's main regional ally, and the Sunni Saudis allegedly funding ISIS, this latest outbreak of bloodshed can be firmly set against the larger background of inter-denominational friction going back over thirteen centuries. 

The Poison of Empire

  As well as the Sunni-Shia conflict, the current war also draws heavily upon the legacy of Europen imperialism in the last two centuries, and Anglo-American neoconservative foreign policy in more recent years. ISIS have released a video proclaiming the establishment of their new Caliphate the 'end of Sykes-Picot'. This refers to the secret Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, which divided the then-Ottoman-ruled lands of Greater Syria and the Levant into British and French spheres of influence. Exposed by the Bolsheviks after they seized control of Russia in 1917, the Agreement broke promises made by the Triple Entente to the Arabs of a single, independent nation-state for their home. It also implicitly committed the Allied powers to Zionism - hardly a recipe for a good start to Arab-European relations.

  Sykes-Picot drew arbitrary borders across the map of the soon-to-be-defeated Ottoman Empire which made no effort to correspond to the actual distribution of ethnic and religious groups in the region. It is mainly down to the peculiarities of this clandestine treaty that the Kurdish people are divided between Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey rather than having their own home; that the Sunni Arabs of Western Iraq and Eastern Syria share states with their Shia and Alawite counterparts rather than each other; and, ultimately, why ISIS has been able to overrun large swathes of both countries by exploiting existing divisions within their fragile structures.

  If Sykes-Picot created the unstable base upon which the whole collapsing edifice of Middle Eastern relations is built, then it was the wars waged by the US-led coalitions in 1991 and 2003 which set the walls tumbling. Whilst the Gulf War was arguably justifiable - Hussein's government had launched an unprovoked attack on a small, oil-rich neighbour - it certainly had consequences which go far beyond the cost of lives and capital expended in waging it. It was this war, after all, which spawned al-Qaeda. The Iraq War, though, was entirely unjustifiable: It was launched without UN backing, sold to the British and American people on false pretenses and fought in the most incompetent manner possible, with virtually no thought given to what would become of the country in its aftermath. 

  The Iraq War shattered the country, and sparked waves of unrest which have engulfed the entire region. Tony Blair may bluster that his pet invasion has nothing to do with ISIS, but anyone with a modicum of common sense - let alone any knowledge of the area and its history - should be able to see through this transparent facade. ISIS is certainly not solely the responsibility of the Blair-Bush alliance, but those two megalomaniacs cannot and should not escape their fair share of the blame.


The Evolution of ISIS

  Despite the recent eruption in media coverage, ISIS itself did not suddenly explode out of nowhere. It began life in around 2000 as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ), the project of Jordanian Salafi Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi - a veteran, like Osama bin Laden, of the Afghan Mujaheddin - originally intended the group to overthrow the Jordanian government, but the group moved to Iraq in 2001 following the Anglo-American invasion of Afghanistan. Foreign Islamic fighters travelling to Iraq to fight against the Western invasion forces from 2003 onwards became increasingly dependent on JTJ and the group's main objectives became the ejection of the occupation forces, the elimination of the Iraqi Shia community and the establishment of a strict Islamic theocracy in Iraq - objectives which remain the core driving force behind ISIS today.

  By 2006, the group was officially part of the expanding al-Qaeda network and known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) . AQI declared the existence of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October 2006 - from this point on, AQI activities were attributed to ISI. AQI waxed in power in Iraq from 2006 to 2008, before entering a period of relative decline. However, the beginning of the withdrawal of US troops from January 2009 saw AQI's resurgence and by April 2013 the group's current leader - Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi - unilaterally declared a merger with Syria's al-Nusra front. Al-Nusra itself and the al-Qaeda leadership protested, but were unable to prevent the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham - ISIS.

  ISIS claims the territories of Iraq and Syria, with implied claims over much of the surrounding Levant region. During 2013 and early 2014, the group seized control of large parts of eastern Syria, effectively appropriating control of the Syrian revolution from al-Nusra, the Islamic Front and the secular Free Syrian Army. The capture of Iraq's second city, Mosul, on 10th June 2014 marked the growing success of ISIS in that country. The month of June saw ISIS seize more and more territory in Iraq, though suffering some small losses in Syria as a result. On the 29th June, ISIS formally proclaimed the Islamic State with its capital in Ar-Raqqah, historic seat of the Abbasid Caliphate, and with al-Baghdadi as Caliph.


The Future of the War

  So, now that we understand something of the nature of the beast that is ISIS, let us look once again at the specifics of the warzone as is. The Islamic State has around 7,000 troops in Iraq and 5,000 in Syria; furthermore, it has access to the latest US-built military technology, taken from the retreating Iraqi Army in early June. Iraq has around 270,000 men; the army's second division has fallen back in disarray but other army sections - such as the battle-hardened first and seventh divisions - are moving to confront the insurgency. Iraq also has new Russian fighter jets which will help it achieve dominance of the skies - as yet, ISIS has no air force.

  Meanwhile, the other players in this battle are readying. The Iraqi Kurdish army - the Peshmerga - numbers 200,000 soldiers, mostly independent of Iraqi central control. There are rumours that the already largely autonomous region of Kurdistan is planning to hold a referendum on independence; as the most economically successful and politically stable part of Iraq, with a large and experienced fighting force, such a move would not prove entirely impractical. There is also the opportunity to link up with the Syrian Kurds to Iraqi Kurdistan's immediate west, paving the way to the Kurdish people's long-cherished dream of a united, independent homeland. ISIS has so far given Kurdistan a relatively wide berth, for good reasons.

  Assad in Damascus also remains important. As an Alawite, his participation in the Sunni-Shia feud is limited, but he has a clear interest in opposing ISIS. With a quarter of a million active military personnel remaining to him, the Ba'ath leader is far from finished. The other Syrian rebel organisations, including the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front, have several tens of thousands of their own troops in the field also (the exact number is unknown). If ISIS wishes to Expand the borders of the Islamic State into the rest of Syria, it will face nothing if not stiff opposition.

  The war must, as noted above, also be seen in the context of the wider Sunni-Shia conflict. Iran, upon whom Maliki has grown ever more dependent, leads the Shia bloc which also includes the Lebanese militants Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia, accused of bankrolling ISIS, heads up the larger Sunni group. These two powerful countries are both highly dictatorial regimes, and are not above using the chaos in Iraq and Syria to their own advantage. Israel, caught up in its own struggle against Hamas - which has itself flared up once again - must also be factored in, as ISIS would be extremely unlikely to tolerate the existence of a Jewish state in the Levant should it attain dominance in the region. As far as the international community is concerned, the West is relatively toothless. The UK and the USA are too war-weary to even consider intervention against ISIS, and Russia seems content merely to supply equipment to Maliki and nothing more. 

  What will happen next? Frankly, the situation is too fragile to make any kind of accurate prediction. Some things can be presupposed, though - Iraq and Syria are unlikely to survive as contiguous states, for one. The emergence of an independent Kurdistan seems increasingly likely and, though the international community is unlikely to accept the Islamic State in its present form, it is clear that the Sunni and Shia communities of the region are unable to coexist at the present time. Some kind of partition is inevitable, whether or not ISIS carries the day. Much depends on whether al-Qaeda, which broke with ISIS in February, endorses the new Caliphate or not. If it does, that will draw many more Islamic militants into the ranks of ISIS and link the fledgling state firmly to the attempt throughout the Middle East and North Africa to impose radical Sunni theocracy. If not, the resulting rupture could scupper the Islamist cause.

 This war is far from over. It will take decades for the damage done to the Middle East to even begin to repair itself, if indeed it ever does. And here in the West, we can do little but watch and hope the repercussions for our own countries are not too severe. Oh, and put Blair and Bush on trial in the Hague. Then dearest Tony can give his opinion all he likes.